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Abstract 
Revenue recognition is one of the most crucial issues in financial reporting and the 
prevalent source for recent accounting scandals. International financial reporting 
standard setters are conducting a major project rethinking revenue recognition. 
Tentative proposals of the project Revenue Recognition feature an asset-liability 
approach relying on measurement at fair values or at allocated customer consideration 
amounts. This paper chooses construction contracts to illustrate and to evaluate the far-
reaching changes implied by the proposals in a multi-period context. Main results 
suggest that the proposals are ambivalent in terms of relevance but critical in terms of 
reliability compared to the recent treatment under IAS 11. Particularly, a pure fair value 
approach yields irritating patterns of revenue recognition found inappropriate for 
stewardship purposes. While its adoption for revenue recognition under IFRSs is 
unlikely due to regulatory incompatibilities, measuring performance obligations at 
allocated consideration amount partly mitigates the concerns. 
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1 Introduction 
 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) are heading to become a globally 
accepted financial reporting system. Since 2005 IFRSs have been compulsory for (at 
least) group accounts of listed companies in the European Union. Approximately 100 
countries worldwide have either adopted IFRSs or linked their national accounting 
systems closely to IFRSs. While relying on “profit … as a measure of performance” 
(Framework.69), IFRSs do lack a well-founded concept of profit. Particularly, 
regulations on revenue recognition show inconsistencies and loopholes (Haller and 
Schloßgangl, 2005; Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005). Under United States Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), revenue recognition is addressed by 
almost 200 references which are not fully consistent either. Yet, revenue recognition is 
one of the most crucial issues in financial reporting internationally and was the 
prevalent source for recent accounting scandals (Government Accountability Office, 
2002, 2006; Benston et al., 2003). 
 
Given (1) deficiencies in both IFRSs and US GAAP and (2) the aim of convergence, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) have been rethinking revenue recognition in a joint project 
since 2002. Largely independent from current financial reporting standards, the project 
Revenue Recognition aims at a general principles-based standard featuring a 
conceptually sound revenue recognition model. This standard shall replace current 
standards on revenue recognition, particularly International Accounting Standard (IAS) 
11 and IAS 18. The tentative proposals feature a valuation-based asset-liability 
approach with the measurement at fair values or at allocated customer consideration 
amounts (IASB, 2005c; IASB and FASB, 2007). While all decisions made to date are 
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tentative, the project debate and proposals spark new interest in concepts of income and 
imply far reaching changes in revenue recognition compared to recent IFRSs. As 
construction contracts, currently addressed by IAS 11, are multi-period projects, they 
give rise to particular problems of revenue and expense recognition. Thus, construction 
contracts provide a unique example to illustrate and discuss implications and 
consequences of the proposed approaches, which are invisible in a single-period 
context. 
 
This paper is among the very first to investigate the project Revenue Recognition 
(Ernstberger, 2005; Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005, 2006), even before the 
standardsetters have published their discussion paper on the approaches developed since 
2002. Its main distinguishing features and objectives are first to illustrate and compare 
the recent and proposed approaches for revenue recognition under IFRSs with particular 
regard to construction contracts. This shall be accomplished by illustrating the main 
regulations in seven versions of a numerical example highlighting their differences. The 
second objective is to evaluate these differences and the proposals of the project 
Revenue Recognition from a financial reporting perspective. This requires a discussion 
with respect to (1) income concepts, (2) characteristics and (3) objectives of financial 
reporting and (4) regulatory compatibility. 
 
Main results show that the proposed approaches are ambivalent in terms of relevance 
and more critical in terms of reliability of financial reporting for construction contracts 
compared to IAS 11. Particularly, the fair value approach (FVA) yields irritating 
patterns of revenue recognition and appears to conflict with the reliability and 
stewardship function of financial reporting, partially mitigated under the allocated 
customer consideration approach (ACCA) proposed. Due to ambiguity of concepts, this 
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implies inconsistencies with both the current framework of IASB and endorsement 
criteria set out by the European Union (Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, Art. 3(2)). While 
revising the framework as currently proposed (IASB, 2006f) can ease the former 
inconsistencies, the latter tend to remain and are likely to impede the adoption of the 
FVA for construction contracts under IFRSs. 
 
The financial reporting perspective on revenue recognition, as advocated in this paper, 
acknowledges that revenue management “focuses on revenue growth, not on cost-
cutting and downsizing. It drives the bottom line, and improves the topline” (Chase, 
1999, p.2). It also clarifies the issue since revenue is the top line and profit (net-revenue) 
is the bottom line of financial income statements. These are quantitative measures for 
the performance of the business including revenue management practices. While the 
revenue management literature discusses various and more sophisticated approaches for 
performance evaluation, revenue and profit as displayed in financial statements play an 
important role (e.g. Harris, 2007; Chiang, Chen and Xi, 2007). They are the key figures 
for investors in general (for survey Kothari, 2001) and for those considering 
construction contracts in particular (Trotman and Zimmer, 1986; Barlev, 1995). Since 
financial reporting and managerial accounting are converging (to some extent), the 
concepts discussed are not limited to financial reporting. They can provide impetus to 
rethink revenue recognition in the construction industry for internal performance 
measurement as well. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides 
conceptual background. Sections 3 and 4 illustrate the recent and the proposed 
approaches, respectively. Section 5 discusses and evaluates the approaches, followed by 
conclusions. 
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2 Conceptual background 
 
2.1 Objectives and characteristics of financial reporting 
 
Internationally, as aimed at specifically in the current conceptual framework by IASB, 
there are two major objectives of financial reporting. Financial reports shall “provide 
information about the financial position, performance and changes in financial position 
of an enterprise that is useful … in making economic decisions” (Framework 12). 
Moreover, reports shall “show the results of the stewardship of management, or the 
accountability of management for the resources entrusted to it” (Framework 14). While 
stating both objectives, IFRSs are more focused on decision-usefulness which is 
explicitly assumed to comprise the stewardship function in the current debate on 
revising the conceptual frameworks of the IASB and of the FASB (IASB, 2006f). 
 
While usefulness of information is ambiguous without a semiotic and double-semiotic 
perspective (Will, 2006), the IASB assumes that ‘qualitative characteristics’ of financial 
information constitute their decision-usefulness; however, the main characteristics of 
relevance and reliability are still not clearly defined and ambiguous (Fetzer and 
Almeder, 1993; Will, 2006). According to Framework 26 “[i]nformation has the quality 
of relevance when it influences the economic decisions of users by helping them 
evaluate past, present or future events or confirming, or correcting their past 
evaluations”. This definition appears tautological given that there is no alternative in 
changing a decision or not. In contrast, economics of information imply that relevance 
in a decision-making context requires a change in decisions (e.g. Demski, 1980; 
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Ballwieser, 2004); philosophy science refers to evidential relevance, where a sentence is 
relevant to a hypothesis only if the truth or falsity of the former makes a difference to 
the truth or falsity of the latter (e.g. Fetzer and Almeder, 1993).[1] Given that financial 
reporting is for many and inhomogeneous users, the IASB (2006f) rather aims at 
information it assumes capable to affect decisions of a wide range of users, particularly 
investors (and creditors). Framework 31 assumes reliability of information as faithfully 
representing what it purports to represent. The information shall be free from error or 
bias by management and verifiable. Given recent proposals for a revised framework 
reliability is likely to be replaced by faithful representation (IASB, 2006f), which refers 
to semantic correspondence with reality (as a type of truth), it can be seen as the 
“property of a method, mechanism, or process by virtue of which it tends to produce 
true beliefs rather than false beliefs” (Fetzer and Almeder, 1993, p.122). Still, reliability 
can conflict with relevance. For instance, historical costs are reliable measures (Kosiol, 
1978), but they might not be relevant for decision-making (Ijiri, 1975). Any rational 
decision-maker will ignore a message assumed not to be reliable since it cannot be 
decision-useful (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). 
 
The stewardship function of financial reporting implies that investors have the right to 
get information about the use of their invested capital. This is an integral part of 
accountability in the relationship between agents and principals aiming at investors’ 
rational confidence in the managers’ respects of their rights (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Will, 2006). While the objectives of stewardship and decision-usefulness overlap, 
accounting standards do influence the decisions of managers (Birnberg, 1980; Hunt, 
1995). Thus, accounting standards need to be evaluated upon the incentives induced on 
managers. Given that the stewardship function requires reliable reports while decision-
usefulness allows for balancing relevance and reliability, both objectives cannot 
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simultaneously be achieved by using the same set of standards in general (Gjesdal, 
1981; Antle and Demski, 1989; Christensen and Demski, 2003). 
 
 
2.2 Income concepts 
 
An economic benchmark for profit is the concept of economic income. It defines income 
as the increase in wealth (Smith, 1870). Fisher (1906) shows that under certain 
conditions, income equals the interest on wealth at the beginning of the period if wealth 
is derived by discounting future cash flows (Solomons, 1961). Economic income is 
forward-looking, relevant for decision-making purposes and appropriate to show 
stewardship (Christensen and Demski, 2003). However, when relaxing the conditions of 
perfect and complete markets, i.e. when leaving a stylised world in which income 
reporting is dispensable, economic income measurement becomes subjective (Beaver 
and Demski, 1979). Since the necessary assumptions about the future are subject to 
managerial discretion, the income figure becomes likely to lack reliability. 
 
Accounting theory distinguishes two major (partly overlapping and again ambiguous) 
concepts of profit. Under the revenue-expense approach, accounting profit is the 
difference between realised income and expense following from transactions and events 
in the corresponding period. The approach focuses on the recognition criteria for 
income and expenses to compute profit. While assets and liabilities are generally carried 
at historical cost until they are used up or sold, revenues and expenses are matched 
(Paton and Littleton, 1955; Ijiri, 1975; Belkaoui, 2000). This is assumed to yield a 
rather reliable measure for profit which is, however, of relevance for few decisions to be 
taken (Chambers, 1966; for a discussion Leuz, 1998). Particularly under conservative 
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accounting, future losses are anticipated while future profits are not (Devine, 1963). The 
asymmetric treatment yields a systematically biased profit figure. 
 
In contrast, the asset-liability approach defines profit as changes in values of assets and 
liabilities. Thus, profit consists of both, realised and unrealised components. Values 
discussed include current values, market values and historical cost (Edwards and Bell, 
1961; Benston et al., 2006). Current or market values are not well defined because they 
can either be entry or exit values. If the market prices are not observable, the values 
have to be estimated giving rise to managerial discretion and problems of reliability 
(Bromwich, 2004; Hitz, 2007).  
 
Noteworthy, the revenue-expense approach may be understood as an asset-liability 
approach carrying assets and liabilities at historical cost yielding ‘pagatoric’ (Kosiol, 
1978) profit. For sake of clarity, the proceeding sections refer to the asset-liability 
approach for any other measurement base. 
 
 
3 Construction contracts under IAS 11 
 
3.1 Definitions and concepts 
 
IAS 11.3 defines a construction contract as “a contract specifically negotiated for the 
construction of an asset or a combination of assets that are closely interrelated or 
interdependent”. Contracts are combined and segmented according to substance over 
form as specified in IAS 11.7-10. 
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The accounting treatment of both contract revenue and contract costs depends on 
whether the economic outcome of the contract can be estimated reliably (Barlev, 1995). 
IAS 11.23-24 determine this condition by requiring two or four criteria to be satisfied 
for cost plus or fixed price contracts, respectively. For the latter, the criteria are stricter 
because the contractor bears higher risk compared to cost plus contracts. Entities have to 
account for revenues and expenses attributable to construction contracts following 
 
(1) the zero profit margin method (ZPMM), when the outcome cannot be estimated 
reliably; 
(2) the stage of completion method (SOCM), otherwise. 
 
Under both approaches, an expected loss on the construction contract has to be 
immediately recognised as an expense (IAS 11.36). 
 
 
3.2 Zero profit margin method (ZPMM) 
 
Under the ZPMM, contract costs are recognized as an expense in the period of 
incurrence. Revenues are recognized to the extent of recoverable contract costs incurred 
(IAS 11.32). Profit is shown when the contract is completed. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT EXAPLE A.] 
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3.3 Stage of completion method (SOCM) 
 
In contrast, under the SOCM (or percentage of completion method), “contract revenue 
and contract costs … should be recognised as revenue and expense respectively by 
reference to the stage of completion of the contract activity at the balance sheet date.” 
(IAS 11.22) The stage of completion can be determined from 
 
(1) an input perspective, e.g., cost-to-cost method or labour hours method; 
(2) an output perspective, e.g., physical observation method. 
 
In practice, the cost-to-cost method is most common. As a matter of fact, this method 
yields expenses equalling the contract costs incurred in each period. Other methods 
generally do not. Then, contract costs have to be adjusted.[2] Any changes in estimates 
are accounted for according to IAS 8. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT EXAPLE B.] 
 
 
4 Construction contracts under the proposals of the project Revenue Recognition 
 
4.1 Definitions and concepts 
 
The project Revenue Recognition follows an asset–liability approach instead of a 
revenue-expense approach (FASB, 2002; IASB, 2002). The boards assume that a 
revenue-expense approach yields severe problems with defining earnings processes and 
is too difficult to be followed. Rather they aim at recognising revenue on the basis of 
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changes in assets and liabilities arising from contracts with customers without 
considering supplemental realisation or earnings criteria (Ernstberger, 2005; 
Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005; IASB and FASB, 2007). 
 
According to the proposed model, enforceable contracts with customers can give rise to 
assets and liabilities. A contract is a set of explicit or implicit promises which a court 
will enforce. Large penalties for a breach of a contract and pre-payment can indicate 
enforceability. Contract inception shall be determined according to general customary 
business practice and the entity’s specific conduct. While contractual rights need not be 
worthy of enforcement, i.e. costs of enforcement exceed its benefits for the potential 
plaintiff, rights or obligations shall be unconditional or mature to give rise to assets or 
liabilities (IASB, 2004c; IASB and FASB, 2007). Unconditional contractual rights and 
obligations can be characterised by only requiring the passage to make performance 
due. They are non-contingent items as opposed to conditional ones subject to the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain events. 
 
To illustrate the difference in a contractual setting, suggest a product warranty. While 
the obligation of the entity issuing a warranty is conditional, there is the unconditional 
obligation to stand-ready to provide warranty coverage. Only the latter gives rise to a 
liability (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005; IASB and FASB, 2007). These concepts are 
also discussed in further projects, including Conceptual Framework and Liabilities 
(FASB, 2005; IASB, 2005g, 2007a). What emerges in all these projects is that the 
probability of future inflows or outflows of resources embodying economic benefits 
shall no longer be included in the definitions of elements but shall affect their 
measurement. 
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IASB agreed on the rebuttable presumption that the unit of account is a whole contract 
if the subjects of a wholly or partially executory contract are fungible and the legal 
remedy for a breach is money. But if the subjects are unique and legal remedy is 
specific performance, the unit of account shall be the assets and liabilities arising.[3] 
Performance obligations are tentatively defined as legally enforceable obligation of a 
reporting entity to its customer, under which the entity is obligated to provide goods, 
services, or other rights. Performance obligations shall be separated from the customer’s 
perspective, i.e. based on whether the performance has identifiable utility to the 
customer. Utility to the customer shall be assumed if the goods, services, or other rights 
underlying the performance obligation can either be resold separately by the customer 
(in a market still to be specified) or be sold separately or as an optional extra by another 
vendor. Moreover, unconditional stand-ready obligations are assumed to have utility to 
the customer and shall be a separate unit of account (IASB, 2006b; IASB and FASB, 
2007). 
 
There are two perspectives discussed to define revenue more precisely, which mainly 
differ when third parties perform (IASB, 2004a, 2006a, 2006d): 
 
(1) Revenues are increases in the reporting entity’s assets or decreases in its liabilities 
resulting from activities which are integral to the provision of goods, services, or 
other rights ultimately destined for customers by the entity itself (broad 
performance view). 
(2) Revenues are decreases in the reporting entity’s liabilities resulting from the 
extinguishment of performance obligations irrespective of whether the entity itself 
or third parties perform on behalf of the entity (liability extinguishment view). 
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The latter view seems to be preferred given that IASB tentatively decided that 
“performance by third parties of the entity’s obligations … unless those third parties 
legally assume those obligations.” (IASB, 2004b). Recently, the notion of customer 
acceptance is further explored (IASB, 2006b, 2006d). The IASB acknowledges that 
income shall be defined before revenue can be defined and that the distinction between 
revenues and gains shall be sharpened (IASB, 2004c). To date, no decision is reached 
on that distinction. 
 
While assets arising from contractual rights shall be measured at their fair value 
considering credit risk and the value of money if material (IASB, 2004b), there is 
controversy on the measurement of performance obligations. Until mid-2005, the 
project relied on the fair value. Due to diverging notions and problems of the 
measurement approach, the IASB and the FASB now explore an alternative 
measurement basis, which allocates the total consideration among the performance 
obligations based on estimated sales prices in general. Thus, two – potentially mixed – 
measurement approaches for performance obligations are discussed (IASB 2006e, 
2007b): 
 
(1) fair value approach (FVA); and 
(2) allocated customer consideration approach (ACCA). 
 
 
4.2 Fair value approach (FVA) 
 
The fair value is defined as “the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a 
liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction” 
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(e.g. IAS 18.7). The project refers to the fair value particularly as a legal layoff amount, 
i.e. the amount which the reporting entity would have to pay to transfer the performance 
obligation to another entity in a business-to-business market (IASB, 2005a). While the 
boards discussed a variety of approaches to measure this kind of exit fair value, 
including transactions of competitors and proposed transactions, they basically agreed 
the FASB’s fair value hierarchy, currently under discussion (Hague et al., 2006; IASB, 
2006g). More particularly, the project refers to measuring fair values based on 
 
(1) quoted prices for identical items on an active market; 
(2) quoted prices of similar items on an active market, if (1) is not possible; or 
(3) valuation models incorporating significant entity-specific inputs, if (1) and (2) are 
not possible. 
 
Given that an active market satisfying IAS 36.6 can be difficult to find for specific 
performance obligations, strictly applying the hierarchy means measuring fair values on 
level (3) in many cases (Bromwich, 2004). This will particularly apply to most 
obligations attributable to construction contracts. Applying the hierarchy less strictly 
can incorporate hypothetical prices charged by other vendors and gives rise to problems 
in determining the relevant market or relevant vendor. 
 
As a major feature of the FVA, revenue (or expense) has to be recognised at the 
inception date if the consideration amount does not equal the aggregate of fair values of 
the performance obligations arising from an enforceable contract at contract inception 
(IASB, 2003b; Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005).[4] Apart from subsequent 
remeasurement, the extinguishment of performance obligations will determine 
subsequent revenue recognition. The boards proposed, but did not decide on 
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remeasuring contractual assets and, more importantly, contractual liabilities at their fair 
value (IASB, 2003a, 2005d, 2006c).  
 
[PLEASE INSERT EXAPLE C.] 
 
 
4.3 Allocated customer consideration approach (ACCA) 
 
While the IASB tends to favour the FVA, the FASB rather abandoned it when 
reviewing the project strategy in mid-2005. The boards agreed on exploring an 
alternative approach measuring performance obligations based on the customer 
consideration amount. This is the amount of consideration paid or to be paid by the 
customer in a business-to-customer market. More particularly, this alternative approach 
aims at measuring performance obligations at the allocated customer consideration 
amount. This amount is determined two-fold. It is the aggregate of the (1) estimated 
sales price of good, service, or other right , and (2) the pro rata portion of the residual 
between the customer consideration amount and the sum of estimated sales prices of the 
performance obligations based on the relative sales price of that performance obligation 
(IASB 2005c; IASB and FASB, 2007). 
 
The first component shall reflect an estimated average sales price. This is the price at 
which a good, service, or other right is sold or is capable of being sold on a stand-alone 
basis or as an optional extra. It shall be measured according to the following hierarchy 
based on (IASB, 2005b, 2005e, 2005f, 2007d) 
 
(1) current sales prices charged by the reporting entity in an active market; 
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(2) current sales prices charged by other vendors, e.g., competitors, in an active market, 
if (1) is not possible; 
(3) current sales prices charged by the reporting entity in an inactive market, if (1) and 
(2) are not possible; or 
(4) estimates reflecting entity-specific inputs, e.g., the reporting entity’s estimated 
(average) costs plus a normal (average) profit margin, if (1) to (3) are not possible. 
 
Much like using valuation models to construct fair values, estimated sales prices of 
performance obligations attributable to construction contracts will often be measured on 
level (4) (IASB, 2004d, 2005c). If there is a difference between the total customer 
consideration and the aggregate of estimated sales prices of performance obligations 
considered, the (positive or negative) residual shall be allocated to the performance 
obligations pro rata based on their estimated sales prices. This yields a measurement 
according to the allocated customer consideration amount, ensuring that no revenue (or 
expense) is recognised at contract inception in general (see Example D). Currently, the 
boards discuss remeasurement of performance obligations under the ACCA (IASB, 
2005d, 2006c). 
 
[PLEASE INSERT EXAPLE D.] 
 
 
4.4 Mixed approach (MA) 
 
While the FASB favours to measure all performance obligations at their allocated 
customer consideration amount, the IASB prefers to exclude (1) unconditional stand-
ready obligations and (2) obligations required to be measured at fair values by a given 
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standard (IASB, 2005f, 2007d). These obligations shall be measured at fair value and no 
residual shall be allocated to them. Moreover, it is (3) proposed to allow or to require to 
measure performance obligations at their fair value if an active market exists (IASB, 
2005b, 2005c). This results in a mixed approach (MA). It should be noted, that in the 
limiting case when all performance obligations are measured at their fair value, the MA 
equals the FVA. This, however, is unlikely when considering construction contracts. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT EXAPLE E.] 
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
5.1 Revenue-expense approach versus asset-liability approach 
 
As illustrated in the preceding sections the current and proposed approaches for revenue 
recognition for constructions contracts under IFRSs notably differ. This section 
critically analyses these differences to assess the implications of the IASB project 
Revenue Recognition on financial reporting. Concerning income concepts, recent  
IAS 11 is rather consistent with a revenue-expense approach whereas the project 
Revenue Recognition features an asset-liability approach. 
 
Based on a revenue-expense approach, IAS 11 relates revenue recognition to realisation 
criteria. While the ZPMM requires recognising revenue when the contract is completed 
and risks and rewards are transferred, the SOCM relies on a softer realisation principle 
by assuming that revenue and profit arise throughout the whole construction process. 
The latter has a smoothing effect on revenue and profits (Paton and Littleton, 1955; 
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Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005; see Examples A and B). The need to recognise expected 
losses on a construction contract immediately as opposed to recognise at contract 
completion or allocating them according to the stage of completion indicates 
conservative accounting. 
 
In contrast, the proposals of the project Revenue Recognition follow an asset-liability 
approach. The traditional realisation principle shall no longer serve as a rule to 
determine income. The US Securities and Exchange Commission even claims that the 
asset-liability approach “most appropriately anchors the standard setting process by 
providing the strongest conceptual mapping to the underlying economic reality” (FASB 
and IASB, 2005, p.8). Unlike under the SOCM, revenue is recognised when a critical 
event, i.e. the extinguishment of a performance obligation, takes place. While the asset-
liability approach can be seen as a sound conceptual base for revenue recognition, many 
problems are shifted to the measurement of performance obligations.  
 
Significantly at this crucial point, the IASB and the FASB reached different tentative 
decisions (IASB and FASB, 2007). The IASB prefers performance obligations to be 
measured at a fair value, i.e. with reference to the market. However, the FASB is in 
favour of the ACCA, referring to estimated sales prices based on competitors prices or 
the entity’s own costs in general. 
 
While details of remeasurement are unsolved to date, the ACCA has a smoothing effect 
on the recognition of revenue and profit compared to fair value measurement. In 
contrast to the SOCM under IAS 11, the ACCA conceptually smoothes both, profits and 
losses (see Example D). Apart from onerous contracts under IAS 11 and IAS 37, only 
the FVA can require to recognise revenue or expense at contract inception (see Example 
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C). This occurs if the initial sum of fair values of performance obligations does not 
equal the consideration amount that both parties agreed on. As an irritating 
consequence, a loss can occur at contract inception although performing the whole 
contract leads to a profit and vice versa. To illustrate this point, suppose that fair values 
are measured relative to competitors’ prices charged. If the reporting entity is the 
cheapest vendor and agrees on a considerable amount below the competitors’ price but 
above its own contract costs, a loss is recognised at contract inception although 
performing the whole contact yields a profit in total. Thus, the cheap vendor incurs 
losses when closing a profitable contract. 
 
While the project does not intend to link revenue recognition to realisation or earnings 
criteria, conceptual, analytical and empirical evidence finds that disaggregating income 
components according to these criteria provides useful information (e.g. Edwards and 
Bell, 1961; Ohlson, 1999; Biddle and Choi, 2006). Suppose subsequent remeasurement 
of contract liabilities (or assets). Evidence implies to separately present amounts arising 
from remeasurement in the income statement. If expenses follow from remeasurement 
and are aggregated with costs of performance, the latter are not visible in the statement 
of (comprehensive) income. This suggests that realisation or earnings criteria are still 
important at least for presentation. 
 
 
5.2 Relevance versus reliability 
 
By relying on a softer realisation principle, the SOCM is likely to yield relevant but 
potentially unreliable information when compared to the ZPMM. Significantly, national 
GAAP in Austria and Germany do not allow the SOCM (Nobes, 2006). These GAAP 
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largely rely on conservative accounting and a narrow interpretation of the realisation 
principle to determine the recognition of profit. They require a completed contract 
treatment, which differs from the ZPMM under IFRSs as no revenue is recognised until 
the contract is completed. 
 
Consistent with conservative accounting, this clearly restricts managerial discretion in 
estimates and forecasts required under the SOCM. However, this conservative treatment 
tends to give rise to a lack of comparability, problems with true and fair view and 
misleading accounting performance, possibly resulting in unfavourable reactions by 
financial statement users or in unfavourable tax effects. 
 
The adoption of IAS 11 challenges accounting for construction contracts in these 
conservative accounting regimes (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005). However, IAS 11 
tries to balance relevance and reliability to some extent by requiring either the use of the 
ZPMM or the SOCM depending on the reliable estimation of the outcome of the 
construction contract (see Examples A and B; Barlev, 1995). Given the flexible criteria 
which determine whether the outcome can be estimated reliably, there is obvious need 
and room for managerial judgement. 
 
Compared to the current IAS 11, the proposals of the project Revenue Recognition do 
not reduce the need for managerial judgement, e.g., with regard to (1) inception date of 
a contract and more obviously to (2) the measurement of performance obligations. This 
is ambivalent along the lines of earnings management, defined as intentionally 
influencing financial statement figures by real transactions and accounting choice to 
impact reactions by financial statement users (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Beneish, 
2001).[5] The manager may use judgement to reveal relevant (private) information or to 
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exercise self-serving discretion potentially affecting reliability. In either case, 
comparability of financial information is impaired. 
 
Although recognising assets and liabilities at contract inception can provide relevant, 
future-orientated information, contract inception (as objective formal reference) allows 
for discretion by referring to customer business practice (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 
2005). As contract inception can change financial ratios, the proposals allow for short-
term window-dressing. Particularly, the FVA can give rise to revenue at the inception 
date and, thus, to real earnings management by contract inception (see Example C). 
While accounting literature has largely discussed the relevance-reliability trade off of 
fair value measurement (for survey Bromwich, 2004; Hague et al., 2006; Hitz, 2007), 
there is neither specific theoretical work nor empirical evidence on allocated customer 
consideration amounts. Although the IASB generally assumes fair values to be a 
relevant measurement base (Cairns, 2006; IASB, 2006g), empirical research provides 
mixed results on value relevance of fair values measured mark-to-market (e.g. Park, 
Park and Ro, 1999; Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001; Khurana and Kim, 2003; 
Graham, Lefanowicz and Petroni, 2003). Moreover, hypothetical liability 
extinguishment values may not be a relevant measurement base if performance 
extinguishment is legally prohibited, not intended or actually not transacted by the 
reporting entity. If market prices are not observable, fair values have to be estimated 
using valuation models incorporating managerial subjectivity. This challenges reliability 
particularly in the case of non-financial liabilities such as performance obligations 
arising from construction contracts (e.g. Ernst and Young, 2005). Concerning the 
allocated customer consideration amount, there are similar problems due to the 
flexibility of valuation models. Basing on estimated sales prices comparable to an exit 
(fair) value, the above results on relevance may merely be transferred if there are no or 
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little residuals allocated to the performance obligations. However, allocated customer 
consideration amounts smooth differences between the sum of estimated sales prices 
and the total consideration in absence of subsequent remeasurement (see Example 
D).[6] This might be relevant given evidence that earnings smoothing can provide 
relevant information (e.g., Arya, Glover, and Sunder, 2003; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006). 
 
If performance obligations are remeasured (at either value) two implications arise. First, 
remeasurement can give rise to valuation-based volatility in profit or loss apart from 
specific performance (Ballwieser, 2004). Secondly, remeasurement allows for 
judgement in each period and for changing accounting earnings management strategies 
weakly restricted by consistency required. Thus, remeasurement (most notably under 
the valuation-based approaches proposed, but to a lesser extent under the SOCM) is 
likely to challenge reliability and has arguable implications for relevance of the 
recognition of revenue and profit. This can impair both decision-usefulness and 
stewardship. 
 
 
5.3 Decision usefulness versus stewardship 
 
The previous section argued that the proposals do not tend to dominate IAS 11 in terms 
of relevance and reliability. Despite ambiguity of the terms, even under the current 
framework of the IASB, this questions decision-usefulness of the proposed concepts 
given that relevance and reliability are the main characteristics constituting decision-
useful financial reporting. Concerning stewardship, results will not change if 
stewardship is purely regarded as a sub-objective of decision-usefulness. Adopting an 
economic point of view, stewardship shall be considered in the light of impact the 
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accounting system has on the manager’s decisions, e.g. by management compensation 
based on accounting profits (Prakash and Rappaport, 1977; Ng, 1978). This view 
appears rather neglected in both, current assessments of standard-setters and literature 
on accounting for construction contracts. 
 
The ZPMM does not reward a manager for economic performance during the periods of 
construction, but punishes him for expected losses on construction contracts. This can 
incite short-term-oriented managers not to engage in construction projects. The SOCM 
mitigates the problem as profits (measured relative to input spent or output performed) 
can approximate economic performance and reward a manager on that base.  
 
However, the SOCM and the approaches proposed in the project Revenue Recognition 
share the issues of managerial discretion in measurement and room for accounting 
earnings management. Suppose a manager plans to leave the entity. He will have 
incentives to calculate upward-biased stages of completion for early periods or upward-
biased fair values for performance obligations first extinguished if the sum of fair values 
of performance obligations is kept stable (see Example C). If the sum of fair values of 
performance obligations may change, the need to recognise an excess of the sum of fair 
values over total consideration as a loss is eager to benchmark and to limit incentives to 
calculate upward-biased fair values. 
 
The allocated customer consideration amount is ambivalent in this regard, too. Given an 
excess of total consideration over the sum of estimated sales prices, managers will 
calculate upward estimated sales prices for performance obligations first performed 
which are allocated a larger proportion of the positive residual. In the reverted case, 
when a negative residual has to be allocated, there are incentives to calculate either 
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upward- or downward-biased estimated sales prices for performance obligations first 
extinguished. This depends on the amount of the residual to be allocated relative to the 
sales prices to be estimated (see Examples D and E). 
 
While specific results on allocated customer consideration amounts are missing, 
analytical models on stewardship find cost accounting superior to fair value accounting 
under most circumstances (Dutta and Zhang, 2002; Baldenius and Reichelstein, 2005). 
Kwon (2005) even suggests conservative accounting is superior since it motivates the 
manager to increase effort. Consistent with room for judgement, this implies that the 
FVA is rather inappropriate for stewardship purposes.  
 
Most notably under the FVA, profit or loss is anticipated relative to the sum of 
extinguishment values at inception date (see Example C). If a profit occurs at contract 
inception, the manager is rewarded for a positive result measured relative to the market, 
not relative to construction cost. Even apart from remeasurement, losses can be 
recognised in the intermediate periods, although a profit can result overall. This implies 
to close contracts that lead to high profits at inception if the manager plans to leave the 
company. Incentives to inflate revenues by contracting at dumping prices are limited, 
however, because any excess of the sum of fair values over the consideration amount 
shall be recognised as expense in the period of contract inception. If a loss results at 
contract inception with profits recognised later on, the manager is punished for contract 
inception although an overall profitable contract is placed. This can create incentives 
not to close economically beneficial contracts (Jensen and Smith, 1985). As a 
consequence, over- or underinvestment problems can occur. 
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5.4 Current versus future regulatory compatibility 
 
The last two sections particularly identified that the approaches proposed in the project 
Revenue Recognition, particularly the FVA, seriously conflict with reliability and with 
stewardship required by the current framework of the IASB (and the FASB). While the 
accounting purposes and terms are ambiguous (Will, 2006), this section addresses 
various incompatibilities in the light of current (supra)national regulatory frameworks 
and potential future regulation based on new developments at the IASB. 
 
Depending on domestic or supranational institutional settings, IFRSs (as standards of a 
private standard-setter) have to meet certain criteria to be adopted or transformed into 
law. For instance, the endorsement criteria set out in Art. 3(2) of Regulation (EC) 
1606/2002 require standards to satisfy reliable information to assess stewardship of 
management. These criteria might be a more profound obstacle for the endorsement of a 
standard following the proposals in the European Union than the true and fair view 
controversially discussed in recent papers (Wüstemann and Kierzek, 2005, 2006; 
Alexander, 2006; Nobes, 2006). The European Union can exert pressure on the IASB 
not only ex-post by not endorsing a standard, but also ex-ante by threatening to do so. 
Thus, it is likely that at least a pure FVA will be overruled. This tends to be supported 
by the FASB preferring the ACCA. 
 
The proposed future objectives and characteristics of financial reporting discussed in the 
joint IASB/FASB project Conceptual Framework appear to reduce the risk 
incompatibilities of the new approaches with the framework (IASB, 2006f, 2007a). 
First, the proposals replace reliability by faithful representation. While both terms are 
ambiguous, the IASB assumes faithful representation to be less critical but comprising 
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all characteristics of reliability. Emerging on a terminological level at first sight, the 
proposed change might urge a more permissive interpretation of the characteristic 
compared to reliability. Secondly, the proposals subsume stewardship under decision-
usefulness, i.e. stewardship shall be no self-contained objective of financial reporting. 
This is surprising in the view of the double-semiotic meaning of stewardship (Will, 
2006) and neglects to consider the effects of incentives for real and accounting earnings 
management set by financial reporting standards, reaffirming a lesser weight on 
reliability of financial reporting. 
 
Concerning recognition, the definitions of assets and liabilities in the current 
Framework 49 include an undefined probability criterion not explicitly required for 
contractual assets and liabilities in the project Revenue Recognition. Again this conflict 
might be mitigated as the boards plan to abandon the probability criterion in revising the 
definitions in the project Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2007a). 
 
While this suggests that current inconsistencies in IFRSs can be overcome by a major 
revision of concepts in interacting projects, there are developments at the IASB that 
may lead to new inconsistencies. To illustrate this point, it is sufficient to revert to two 
projects, i.e. Liabilities (IASB, 2005g) and Insurance Contracts (phase II) (IASB, 
2007c), both featuring an asset-liability approach. The proposals on amending IAS 37 
imply measuring non-financial liabilities “at the amount that it would rationally pay to 
settle the present obligation or to transfer it to a third party on the balance sheet date” 
using “an expected cash flow approach” in general (IASB, 2005g, p.28). Implicitly, the 
board appears to refer to some kind of ambiguous „fair value“.  
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Insurance liabilities are about to be measured at a current exit value (IASB, 2007c). 
Here, the IASB states: “It is too early to conclude whether current exit value is 
synonymous with fair value. The Board will review that question as work proceeds on 
the Board’s fair value measurement project” (IASB, 2006h, para. 26). Assuming the 
measures are fair values (IASB, 2006g), both projects conflict with the ACCA, but 
might fit with the MA or the FVA. Even assuming fair value measurement, there is still 
controversity on whether or not to allow for profit or loss at the inception date of an 
insurance contract. To avoid profit or loss at contract inception, the project Insurance 
Contracts suggests to adjust risk margins or to include service margins in measuring 
insurance liabilities. Yet, this is implies inconsistencies with the FVA as proposed in the 
project Revenue Recognition. 
 
Such inconsistencies are attributable to the ambiguity of terms, most notably of fair 
value as well as to (partly) missing links among current projects. Yet, a close 
collaboration among current projects is essential as they lack an appropriate framework 
as a coherent and cohesive base for developing consistent standards to date. The 
proceeding of major projects, like Revenue Recognition, will drive the development of a 
future framework for financial reporting, rather than vice versa. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper has illustrated and evaluated the impact of the proposals of the IASB/FASB-
project Revenue Recognition on financial reporting for construction contracts under 
IFRSs. Featuring an asset-liability approach as opposed to a revenue-expense approach 
and measurement at fair values or allocated customer consideration amounts, the 
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proposals have far-reaching consequences on revenue and profit recognition when 
compared to IAS 11. The Appendix A summarises the differences between the 
approaches and their consequences. Semantic and pragmatic problems with reliability 
and stewardship cause inconsistencies with both the current framework of the IASB and 
endorsement criteria set out by the European Union (Regulation (EC) 1606/2002, Art. 
3(2)). While the former can be mitigated by revising the framework as currently 
proposed, the latter tend to remain and are likely to impede the adoption of the FVA for 
construction contracts under IFRSs. In conclusion, the ACCA or the MA proposed are 
more likely to be followed. 
 
The paper is among the very first to discuss the proposals of the project Revenue 
Recognition critically and has questioned various concepts applied with particular 
reference to construction contracts. Further details of aggregation or segmentation of 
contracts, multi-element arrangements or on the separation of revenue components are 
still under discussion. The IASB and the FASB plan to publish a discussion paper in 
mid-2008, presenting both the FVA and the ACCA as well as proposals for the MA 
(IASB, 2006e, 2007b; IASB and FASB, 2007). The project is an opportunity to 
establish a coherent and consistent conceptual foundation for revenue recognition and 
income determination under IFRSs and deserves further deliberation and discussion 
among academics, professionals and regulatory bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Acknowledgements 
 
The author wants to thank the editor Jason C.H. Chen, three anonymous reviewers, 
Silvia Hettich, participants of the 29th Annual Conference of the European Accounting 
Association in Dublin and seminar participants at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University 
of Munich for their constructive criticism and suggestions for improvements. 
 
 29 
References 
 
Alexander, D. (2006) ‘Legal certainty, European-ness and realpolitik’, Accounting in 
Europe, Vol. 3, pp.65-80. 
Antle, R. and Demski, J.S. (1989) ‘Revenue recognition’, Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Vol. 5, pp.423-451. 
Arya, A., Glover, J.C. and Sunder, S. (2003) ‘Are unmanaged earnings always better for 
shareholders?’, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 17, pp.111-116. 
Baldenius, T. and Reichelstein, S. (2005) ‘Incentives for efficient inventory 
management: the role of historical cost’, Management Science, Vol. 51, pp.1032-
1045. 
Ballwieser, W. (2004) ‘The limitations of financial reporting’, in C. Leuz, D. Pfaff and 
A. Hopwood (Eds), The Economics and Politics of Accounting (pp.58-77). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Barlev, B. (1995) ‘Determining the stage at which it is appropriate to recognise profit 
under long-term construction’ Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 
22, pp.713-731. 
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H. and Landsman, W.R. (2001) ‘The relevance of the value 
relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting: another view’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 31, pp.77-104. 
Beaver, W.H. and Demski, J.S. (1979) ‘The nature of income measurement’, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 54, pp.38-46. 
Belkaoui, A.R. (2000) Accounting Theory (4th ed.). London: University Press 
Cambridge. 
Beneish, M.D. (2001) ‘Earnings management: a perspective’, Managerial Finance, Vol. 
27, pp.3-17. 
Benston, G., Bromwich, M., Litan, R.E. and Wagenhofer, A. (2003) Following the 
Money: the Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure. Washington: 
AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies. 
Benston, G., Bromwich, M., Litan, R.E. and Wagenhofer, A. (2006) Worldwide 
Financial Reporting. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berle, A.A. and Means, G.C. (1932) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
New York Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Biddle, G.C. and Choi, J-H. (2006) ‘Is comprehensive income useful?’, Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Vol. 2, pp.1-32. 
Birnberg, J.G. (1980) ‘The role of accounting in financial disclosure’, Accounting, 
Organization and Society, Vol. 5, pp.71-80. 
Bromwich, M. (2004) ‘Aspects of the future in accounting: the use of market prices and 
‘fair values’ in financial reports’, in C. Leuz, D. Pfaff and A. Hopwood (Eds), The 
Economics and Politics of Accounting (pp.32-57). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cairns, D. (2006) ‘The use of fair value in IFRS’, Accounting in Europe, Vol. 3, pp.5-
22.  
Chambers, R.J. (1966) Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behaviour. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Chase, C.W. Jr., (1999) ‘Revenue management: a review’, Journal of Business 
Forecasting Methods and Systems, Vol. 18, pp.2, 28-30. 
Chiang, W.-C., Chen, J.C.H. and Xi, X. (2007) ‘An overview of research on revenue 
management: current issues and future research’, Int. J. Revenue Management, 
Vol. 1, pp.97-128. 
 30 
Christensen, J.A. and Demski, J.S. (2003) Accounting Theory – an Information Content 
Perspective. Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Crawford, V. and Sobel, J. (1982) ‘Strategic information transmission’, Econometrica, 
Vol. 50, pp.1431-1451. 
Dechow, P. and Skinner, D.J. (2000) ‘Earnings management: reconciling the views of 
accounting academics, practitioners and regulators’, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 
14, pp.235-250. 
Demski, J.S. (1973) ‘The general impossibility of normative accounting standards’, The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 48, pp.718-723. 
Demski, J.S. (1980) Accounting Theory (2nd ed.). Reading: Addison-Wesley.  
Devine, C.T. (1963) ‘The role of conservatism re-examined’, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 1, pp.127-138. 
Dutta, S. and Zhang, X.-J. (2002) ‘Revenue recognition in a multiperiod agency 
setting’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40, pp.67-83. 
Edwards, E.O. and Bell, P.W. (1961) The Theory and Measurement of Business Income. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Ernst and Young (2005) How Fair is Fair Value?. London: Ernst and Young. 
Ernstberger, J. (2005) ‘Revenue recognition – a conceptual review of the proposed 
model of the IASB’, Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Workshop 
Accounting in Europe 2005 and Beyond in Regensburg, September. 
Fetzer, J.H. and Almeder, R.F. (1993) Glossary of Epistemology/Philosophy of Science. 
New York: Paragon House. 
Fisher, I. (1906) The Nature of Capital and Income. New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Gjesdal, F. (1981) ‘Accounting for stewardship’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 
19, pp.208-231. 
Government Accountability Office (2002) Financial Statement Restatements – Trends, 
Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges. Report GAO-
03-138, Washington (www.gao.gov). 
Government Accountability Office (2006) Financial Restatements – Update of Public 
Company Trends, Market Impacts, and Regulatory Enforcement Activities. Report 
GAO-06-678, Washington (www.gao.gov). 
Graham, R.C., Lefanowicz, C.E. and Petroni, K.R. (2003) ‘The value relevance of 
equity method fair value disclosures’, Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 30, pp.1065-1088. 
Hague, I.P.N., Jones, K., Milburn, A. and Walsh, M. (2006) ‘New developments in the 
framework for financial reporting: the role of national standard setters and the 
Canadian contribution to research on measurement on initial recognition and a 
framework for disclosure of financial information’, Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 17, pp.256-270. 
Haller, A. and Schloßgangl, M. (2005) ‘Shortcomings of performance reporting under 
IAS/IFRS: a conceptual and empirical study’, Int. J. Accounting, Auditing and 
Performance Evaluation, Vol. 2, pp.281-299. 
Harris, F.H.deB. (2007) ‘Large-scale entry deterrence of a low-cost competitor: an early 
success of airline revenue management’, Int. J. Revenue Management, Vol. 1, 
pp.5-27. 
Hitz, M. (2007) ‘The decision-usefulness of fair value accounting – a theoretical 
perspective’, The European Accounting Review, Vol. 16, pp.323-362. 
Hunt, S.C. (1995) ‘A review and synthesis of research in performance evaluation in 
public accounting’, Journal of Accounting Literature, Vol. 15, pp.107-139. 
Ijiri, Y.C. (1975) Theory of Accounting Measurement. Sarasota American Accounting 
Association. 
 31 
Jensen, M.C. and Smith, C.W. Jr. (1985) ‘Stockholder, manager, and creditor interests: 
applications of agency theory’, in E.I. Altman and M.G. Subrahmanyam (Eds), 
Recent Advances in Corporate Finance (pp.93-131). Homewood: Irwin. 
Khurana, I.K. and Kim, M.-S. (2003) ‘Relative value relevance of historical cost vs. fair 
value: evidence from bank holding companies’, Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, Vol. 22, pp.19-42. 
Kosiol, E. (1978) Pagatoric Theory of Financial Income Determination. Urbana: Center 
for Education and Research in Accounting. 
Kothari, S.P. (2001) ‘Capital markets research in accounting’, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, Vol. 31, pp.105-231. 
Kwon, Y.K. (2005) ‘Accounting conservatism and managerial incentives’, Management 
Science, Vol. 51, pp.1626-1632. 
Leuz, C. (1998) ‘The role of accrual accounting in restricting dividends to 
shareholders’, The European Accounting Review, Vol. 7, pp.597-604. 
Ng, D.S. (1978) ‘An information economics analysis of financial reporting and external 
auditing’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 53, pp.910-920. 
Nobes, C.W. (2006) ‘Revenue recognition and EU endorsement of IFRSs’, Accounting 
in Europe, Vol. 3, pp.81-89. 
Ohlson, J.A. (1999) ‘On transitory earnings’, Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 4, 
pp.145-162. 
Park, M., Park, T. and Ro, B.T. (1999) ‘Fair value disclosures for investment securities 
and bank equity: evidence from SFAS 115’, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance, Vol. 14, pp.347-370. 
Paton, W.A. and Littleton, A.C. (1955) An Introduction to Corporate Accounting 
Standards (6th print). Ann Arbor: American Accounting Association. 
Prakash, P. and Rappaport, A. (1977) ‘Information inductance and its significance for 
accounting’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 2, pp.29-38. 
Smith, A. (1870) An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(reprint of the 1812 ed.). London: Ward, Lock. 
Solomons, D. (1961) ‘Economic and accounting concepts of income’, The Accounting 
Review, Vol. 36, pp.374-383. 
Trotman, K.T. and Zimmer, I.R. (1986) ‘Revenue recognition in the construction 
industry: an experimental study’, Abacus, Vol. 22, pp.136-147. 
Tucker, J. and Zarowin, P. (2006) ‘Does income smoothing improve earnings 
informativeness?’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, pp.251-270. 
Will, H. (2006) ‘Knowledge management and administration depend on semiotic 
information systems’, Int. J. Management and Decision Making, Vol. 7, pp.36-57. 
Wüstemann, J. and Kierzek, S. (2005) ‘Revenue recognition under IFRS revisited: 
conceptual models, current proposals and practical consequences’, Accounting in 
Europe, Vol. 2, pp.69-106. 
Wüstemann, J. and Kierzek, S. (2006) ‘True and fair view revisited – a reply to 
Alexander and Nobes’, Accounting in Europe, Vol. 3, pp.91-116. 
 
 32 
Regulatory materials 
 
FASB (2002) Minutes: Revenue Recognition. Joint FASB/IASB Board Meeting 
25.9.2002. 
FASB (2005) Selected Issues Relating to Assets and Liabilities with Uncertainties. 
Financial Accounting Series 1235-001, September. 
FASB and IASB (2005) Revisiting the Concepts: A New Conceptual Framework 
Project, May. 
IASB (2002) IASB Update, September. 
IASB (2003a) IASB Update, July. 
IASB (2003b) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 17.–
19.9.2003. 
IASB (2004a) IASB Update, January. 
IASB (2004b) IASB Insight, October/November. 
IASB (2004c) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 17.–
19.3.2005. 
IASB (2004d) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 
22.6.2004. 
IASB (2005a) IASB Update, June. 
IASB (2005b) IASB Update, September. 
IASB (2005c) IASB Update, October. 
IASB (2005d) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 22.–
23.6.2005. 
IASB (2005e) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 
20.9.2005. 
IASB (2005f) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 
19.10.2005. 
IASB (2005g) Exposure Draft: Proposed Amendments to IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets and IAS 19 Employee Benefits, June. 
IASB (2006a) IASB Update, January. 
IASB (2006b) IASB Update, July. 
IASB (2006c) IASB Update, September. 
IASB (2006d) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 
20.7.2006. 
IASB (2006e) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. Board Meeting, 
19.9.2006. 
IASB (2006f) Discussion Paper: Preliminary Views on an Improved Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting: The Objectives of Financial Reporting and 
Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-useful Financial Reporting Information, 
July. 
IASB (2006g) Discussion Paper: Fair Value Measurements, November. 
IASB (2006h) Project Update: Insurance Contracts (Phase II), December. 
IASB (2007a) Project Update: Conceptual Framework, July. 
IASB (2007b) IASB Update, October. 
IASB (2007c) Discussion Paper: Preliminary Views on Insurance Contracts, May. 
IASB and FASB (2007) Information for Observers: Revenue Recognition. IASB/FASB 
Meeting, 22.10.2007. 
 
All regulatory materials are available at the websites of the FASB (www.fasb.org) or the 
IASB (www.iasb.org), respectively. 
 33 
Standards/Framework 
 
IAS 8 (2003) Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors. 
IAS 11 (1993) Construction Contracts. 
IAS 18 (1993) Revenue. 
IAS 36 (2003) Impairment of Assets. 
IAS 37 (1998) Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. 
IAS 39 (2005) Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. 
IAS 41 (2000) Agriculture. 
IASB Framework (1989) Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Instruments. 
SOP 81-1 (1981) Accounting for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain 
Production-Type Contracts. 
 
 34 
Notes 
 
[1] Particularly, since financial reporting addresses multiple and inhomogeneous users, 
the economics of information perspective can not legitimate (normative) standard-
setting (Demski, 1973). Empirical accounting research tends to rely on statistical 
relevance, e.g., based on the concept of value relevance. 
[2] IAS 11.22 requires that both contract revenues and contract costs to be recognised 
as revenue and expense respectively according to the stage of completion. This 
prohibits an adjustment of contract revenue, e.g., as allowed under US GAAP (SOP 
81-1). Adjusting contract costs requires (1) positive accruals when contract costs 
incurred in a period exceed expenses according to the stage of completion of the 
period and (2) negative accruals in the reverse case. 
[3] This corresponds with distinguishing contractual obligations settled by financial or 
non-financial items in the course financial instruments (IAS 39.5). 
[4] Yet, under current IFRSs, initial recognition of financial instruments or biological 
assets at fair value can give rise to profit or loss (IAS 39, IAS 41). 
[5] Taking a pure financial reporting perspective, revenue management might be 
defined analogously to earnings management, focussing on revenue as the top line 
of income statements. 
[6] Considering a construction contract, any multiplicative transformation of the vector 
of estimated sales prices (with the multiplier differing from zero) yields an equal 
vector of allocated customer consideration amounts of the performance obligations. 
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Example A: ZPMM 
 
 
Suppose a reporting entity which incepts an enforceable contract in t0 with total 
customer consideration of 120. From t1 to t4 the entity performs a separate performance 
obligation in each period. Contract costs are 40 in t1, 20 in t2, 25 in t3 and 15 in t4, 
yielding total contract costs of 100. In t4 the customer accepts the work and is charged 
120. For simplicity, all examples do not consider (1) problems of disaggregating 
performance obligations, (2) remeasurement of performance assets and liabilities, and 
(3) deferred taxes. 
 
To illustrate the ZPMM suppose that the outcome of the construction contract cannot be 
estimated reliably during t1 to t3. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue - 40 20 25 35 120 
expense - 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit - 0 0 0 20 20 
contract asset - 40 60 85 120 
contract liabilities - - - - - 
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Example B: SOCM 
 
 
Suppose the outcome of the construction contract can be estimated reliably and the 
stage of completion is determined by reference to contract costs incurred for work 
performed. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue - 48 24 30 18 120 
expense - 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit - 8 4 5 3 20 
contract asset - 48 72 102 120 
contract liabilities - - - - - 
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Example C: FVA 
 
C1. Suppose an enforceable (e.g., prepaid) construction contract where the fair values of 
each performance obligation from t1 to t4 is 35, i.e., 140 in total. This exceeds total 
customer consideration by 20. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue (20) 35 35 35 35 120 
expense = 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit (20) (5) 15 10 20 20 
contract asset 120 120 120 120 120 
contract liabilities 140 105 70 35 - 
 
 
C2. Suppose the fair value of the each performance obligation is 25 instead of 35. Their 
sum falls below total customer consideration by 20. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue 20 25 25 25 25 120 
expense - 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit 20 (15) 5 0 10 20 
contract asset 120 120 120 120 120 
contract liabilities 100 75 50 25 - 
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Example D: ACCA 
 
 
D1. Suppose the estimated sales price of each performance obligation is 35, i.e., 
yielding a total of 140. The negative residual of (20) to total customer consideration is 
allocated pro rata to the four performance obligations from t1 to t4, each measured at 30. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue - 30 30 30 30 120 
expense - 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit - (10) 10 5 15 20 
contract asset 120 120 120 120 120 
contract liabilities 120 90 60 30 - 
 
 
D2. Suppose the estimated sales price underlying each performance obligation is 25 
instead of 35. 
 
Allocating the positive residual of 20 yields the same result as in example D1. 
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Example E: MA 
 
 
Suppose that estimated sales prices of the performance obligations in t1 and t2 are 25 
each, while fair values of the performance obligations in t3 and t4 are 25 each. The 
residual of 20 is only allocated to the obligations performed in t1 and t2 which are 
measured at 35 each. 
 
 
 t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 sum 
revenue - 35 35 25 25 120 
expense - 40 20 25 15 100 
gross profit - (5) 15 0 10 20 
contract asset 120 120 120 120 120 
contract liabilities 120 85 50 25 - 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 zero profit margin method 
(ZPMM) 
stage of completion method 
(SOCM) 
fair value approach 
(FVA) 
allocated customer 
consideration approach 
(ACCA) 
mixed approach 
(MA) 
regulation according 
to IFRSs 
IAS 11.32 IAS 11.22 project proposal rather 
favoured by the IASB 
project proposal rather 
favoured by the FASB 
compromise project proposal  
example A B C D E 
concept revenue-expense approach revenue-expense approach asset-liability approach asset-liability approach asset-liability approach 
benchmark for 
revenue recognition 
recoverable contract cost stage of completion market prices estimated sales prices market prices or estimated 
sales prices 
benchmark for profit 
recognition 
contract completion stage of completion extinguishment/performance 
of performance obligations 
extinguishment/performance 
of performance obligations 
extinguishment/performance 
of performance obligations 
benchmark for loss 
recognition 
probable loss on 
construction contract 
probable loss on 
construction contract 
measurement of 
performance obligations, 
probably remeasurement 
measurement of 
performance obligations, 
potentially remeasurement 
measurement of 
performance obligations, 
potentially remeasurement 
revenue recognition 
at contract inception 
no, only when expected 
overall losses 
no, only when expected 
overall losses 
yes, if fair values of 
performance obligations 
differ from consideration 
amount 
no no in general, but possible 
depending on measurement 
of performance obligations 
remeasurement - yes unsolved, but probable unsolved unsolved, partly probable 
conservative 
accounting 
yes, strong yes, due to immediate loss 
recognition 
no no, apart from 
remeasurement 
no, partly depending on 
remeasurement 
relevance Low rather high disputable disputable disputable 
reliability High rather low low low low 
decision usefulness rather low disputable rather low, but disputable disputable disputable 
stewardship low, but reliable rather high, but managerial 
discretion 
low rather high, but managerial 
discretion 
disputable, depending on 
measurement, but 
managerial discretion 
 
Synopsis of differences in approaches for revenue recognition for construction contracts under IFRSs. 
 
